





1 including text, photo, video, audio and other types of files. Users of Wickr’s mobile messaging product  
2 include law enforcement agents, journalists and human rights activists, families including young  
3 children and teens, professionals and celebrities worldwide. Transparency is critical to Wickr’s mission  
4 to build and protect the human right to privacy and free expression.

5 The Wikimedia Foundation is a non-profit organization based in San Francisco, California, that  
6 operates twelve free-knowledge projects on the Internet. Wikimedia’s mission is to develop and  
7 maintain “wiki”-based projects, and to provide the full contents of those projects to individuals around  
8 the world free of charge. The most well known of Wikimedia’s projects is Wikipedia—a free Internet  
9 encyclopedia that is the sixth-most visited website in the world and largest collection of shared  
10 knowledge in human history. Wikimedia has fewer than 250 employees.

## 11 INTRODUCTION

12 This case is about an Internet company’s desire to be transparent about its role—or lack  
13 thereof—in national security investigations. Twitter, Inc. seeks a declaratory judgment that it has a  
14 right under the First Amendment to publish aggregate statistics about national security requests it has  
15 received from the government, and the laws and government orders restricting its ability to do so are  
16 unconstitutional and unlawful.

17 The outcome of this case is important for small Internet companies and communication  
18 service providers working to be transparent about their practices and provide meaningful information  
19 to the public. Reporting national security requests in the manner approved by the Justice Department  
20 obfuscates rather than illuminates the volume of national security requests a small company receives.  
21 We simply want to offer useful, accurate information and respond to the concerns of our users. *Amici*  
22 urge the Court to deny the government’s partial motion to dismiss and proceed to the merits.

## 23 BACKGROUND AND FACTS

24 In this case, Twitter is suing the United States to establish its right to publish information  
25 about the aggregate number of national security requests the company receives from the government.  
26 Twitter filed suit after the Department of Justice denied Twitter permission to publish a transparency  
27 report in which Twitter wishes to provide aggregate numbers of national security process in smaller  
28

1 bands than those currently approved by the government. Twitter also wants the freedom to report that  
2 it received zero national security requests if appropriate. Twitter seeks a declaration that the  
3 government's restrictions violate Twitter's First Amendment rights and the Administrative Procedure  
4 Act. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.

5 Twitter also challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709 and 3511, two statutes that  
6 authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation to issue national security letters (NSLs) in  
7 counterintelligence investigations demanding non-content information from telecommunications and  
8 Internet service providers. These letters are issued unilaterally by the Bureau without any prior judicial  
9 review, and are almost always accompanied by a non-disclosure order barring the recipient from  
10 revealing anything about the demand. Compl. ¶¶ 46-48. In fact, nondisclosure orders accompany about  
11 97 percent of all NSLs issued by the FBI. *Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and*  
12 *Recommendations from the President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies* 92 (Dec. 12,  
13 2013).

14 Finally, Twitter asserts that to the extent the government relies on the nondisclosure provisions  
15 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to prevent Twitter from publishing the aggregate number  
16 of FISA orders it receives, those provisions are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to  
17 Twitter. Compl. ¶¶ 49-50.

18 The government has moved to dismiss Twitter's complaint in part, claiming 1) the Court lacks  
19 subject matter jurisdiction to review a letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to certain  
20 Internet companies explaining what national security statistics they are permitted to publish, 2) the  
21 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should hear the challenge to FISA's nondisclosure provisions,  
22 and 3) Twitter's challenge to the NSL standard of review fails as a matter of law.

## 23 ARGUMENT

24 *Amici* urge this Court to reach the merits of this case and determine whether companies have a  
25 right to report data about national security requests. This question is crucial for all companies like *amici*  
26 seeking to provide accurate, useful information to their users in the aftermath of momentous public  
27 disclosures about government surveillance.

1           In June 2013, a National Security Agency contractor named Edward Snowden leaked a trove  
2 of agency records to the media, exposing government surveillance activities far more extensive than  
3 previously known to the public and raising profound questions about the lawfulness of those activities.  
4 Among other revelations, the records disclosed a surveillance program known as PRISM in which the  
5 NSA taps directly into the servers of Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, and several other  
6 prominent Internet companies to collect users' emails, photos, audio and video communications,  
7 searches, connection logs, and other information. Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, *U.S., British*  
8 *Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program*, WASH. POST, June 6,  
9 2013;<sup>1</sup> Glenn Greenwald and Ewan MacAskill, *NSA PRISM Program Taps in to User Data of Apple,*  
10 *Google and Others*, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013.<sup>2</sup> While PRISM is intended to gather intelligence about  
11 designated foreigners abroad, the program also sweeps up the data of Americans who are  
12 communicating with those targets. The Internet companies disputed that they gave the government  
13 direct access to their servers, as the press had reported. Joshua Brustein, *The Companies' Lines on*  
14 *PRISM*, BLOOMBERG, June 7, 2013.<sup>3</sup>

15           In the wake of the Snowden leak, several major Internet companies negotiated with the  
16 Department of Justice for the right to publicly disclose aggregate information about the national  
17 security requests they receive from the government. When these negotiations failed to yield results,  
18 Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and LinkedIn filed suit in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance  
19 Court seeking to establish that they have a First Amendment right to publish basic aggregate data  
20 about the FISA orders they receive. *See* Ryan Gallagher, *Tech Giants United in Court to Fight Against*  
21 *Government Surveillance Secrecy*, SLATE, Sept. 10, 2013.<sup>4</sup>

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 <sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html).

24  
25 <sup>2</sup> Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data>.

26 <sup>3</sup> Available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-06-07/the-companies-lines-on-prism>.

27 <sup>4</sup> Available at [http://www.slate.com/blogs/future\\_tense/2013/09/10/yahoo\\_google\\_facebook\\_microsoft\\_fight\\_for\\_permission\\_to\\_release\\_data\\_about.html](http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/10/yahoo_google_facebook_microsoft_fight_for_permission_to_release_data_about.html).

1           The case settled when those companies reached an agreement with the Justice Department  
2 permitting them to report national security requests in two different ways. Letter From James M. Cole,  
3 Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, to General Counsels of Facebook, Google,  
4 LinkedIn, Microsoft, and Yahoo, Jan. 27, 2014.<sup>5</sup> The first option is to report numbers of NSLs,  
5 customer accounts affected by NSLs, FISA orders for content, FISA orders for non-content, and  
6 customer selectors targeted by each type of FISA order as separate categories in bands of 1000,  
7 beginning with 0 (*i.e.*, 0-999). *Id.* at 2-3. Alternatively, the companies could choose to report the total  
8 number of all national security requests received, and the total number of customer selectors targeted  
9 by all national security process, in bands of 250, beginning with 0 (*i.e.*, 0-249). *Id.* at 3. The government  
10 apparently takes the position that these restrictions apply not only to the parties to the agreement, but  
11 more broadly to other companies, as well. Compl. ¶¶ 35-40.

12           The current Justice Department framework makes it impossible for small companies like  
13 *amici* to paint a truthful picture of what we see. The negotiated solution may work well for large  
14 companies that receive a high number of national security requests. But the bands are simply too wide  
15 for us to give our users any useful sense of the volume of national security requests we may receive.  
16 Under the Justice Department's rules, it does not matter if the number is zero, one, or 100, because the  
17 figures will always be the same: 0-249 or 0-999.

18           Compare these permitted ranges to the number of regular law enforcement requests that  
19 *amici* can report with specificity. For example, between July 1 and December 31, 2013, Automatic  
20 received 36 non-national security requests for user information from all law enforcement authorities  
21 worldwide (including all federal and state authorities).<sup>6</sup> CloudFlare received 50 non-national security  
22 requests from law enforcement throughout the United States during 2013.<sup>7</sup> Both companies detailed

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>5</sup> Available at <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/366201412716018407143.pdf>.

25 <sup>6</sup> Automatic, *Information Requests*, <http://transparency.automattic.com/information-requests-2013-h2>  
26 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).

27 <sup>7</sup> CloudFlare, *2013 Transparency Report: 1/1/2013-12/31/2013*, <https://www.cloudflare.com/transparency2013>  
28 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).

1 the number and type of these requests in their transparency reports—but reported that they received  
2 0-249 national security requests for the same period, even though the high end of the permitted range  
3 is several times the number of *all* law enforcement requests each company received. Did these  
4 companies receive no national security requests? A handful? A couple hundred? According to the  
5 Justice Department, they are not allowed to say—which leaves their users with more questions than  
6 answers when it comes to this highly sensitive and controversial category of request. Reporting this  
7 way creates speculation about the level of government interest in a service, which invariably leads to  
8 suspicion and lack of trust from users and the public.

9 This reporting framework is a poor fit for companies like ours, and the erosion of trust it  
10 causes has a very real, negative impact on our businesses. Users of online platforms and  
11 communications services are more sensitive than ever to disclosures of their data to governments, and  
12 there is a strong desire for truthful, accurate information about government interest in our users' data  
13 (or lack thereof). This is especially true for our many users outside the United States, who may decide  
14 to use competing services based abroad if we lose their confidence. *See generally* Danielle Kehl, New  
15 America's Open Technology Institute, *Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom*  
16 *& Cybersecurity* 7-19 (July 2014) (discussing the negative economic impact of the surveillance  
17 revelations on American businesses, both domestically and internationally).<sup>8</sup>

18 We just want to speak truthfully, address the legitimate concerns of our users, and provide  
19 useful information to the public. We urge the Court to deny the government's partial motion to  
20 dismiss and proceed to the merits. This case raises a basic question that is not resolved by the Justice  
21 Department's framework: to what extent do companies have a right to report data about national  
22 security requests? *Amici* believe that there is no basis in law or policy for the government to prohibit  
23 recipients from disclosing the mere fact that they have or have not received a national security request  
24 and from publishing an accurate account of that statistic. We hope the Court will address this question

25  
26  
27 <sup>8</sup> Available at [http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/  
28 Surveillance\\_Costs\\_Final.pdf](http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveillance_Costs_Final.pdf).

1 to provide legal certainty for all service providers, large and small, seeking to be upfront with their  
2 users.

3 **CONCLUSION**

4 *Amici* respectfully request that this Court deny the government's partial motion to dismiss and  
5 reach the merits of the case.

6

7 DATED: February 17, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

8

9 /s/ Marcia Hofmann

10

Marcia Hofmann

11

25 Taylor Street

12

San Francisco, CA 94102

13

marcia@marciahofmann.com

14

Telephone: (415) 830-6664

15

16 Attorney for *Amici Curiae*

17

Automatic Inc.; CloudFlare, Inc.; CREDO Mobile,

18

Inc.; A Medium Corp.; Sonic.net, Inc.; Wickr, Inc.;

19

and the Wikimedia Foundation

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28